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1Introduction
An Ethics of the Unruly
There is ethics —  that is to say, an injunction which 
cannot be grounded in ontology —  in so far as there is a 
crack in the ontological edifice of the universe: at its most 
elementary, ethics designates fidelity to this crack.
Slavoj Žižek
The late twentieth century witnessed unprecedented attention to ethics in 
literary studies. This burgeoning academic interest proved strong enough to 
earn the label “Ethical Turn,” a term that points to an undeniable shift in the 
concerns of interpretive communities but risks homogenizing the unruly 
voices responsible for such a change.1 A genealogy of the turn quickly reveals 
its contested origins, its fraught beginnings, and its uncertain duration. Is/was 
the “Ethical Turn” a mere moment in the cyclical history of interpretive turns, 
situated between the “Linguistic Turn” and the nascent “Aesthetic Turn,” with 
the “Political Turn” eagerly waiting in the hermeneutic queue?2 While debates 
over the function of literary criticism surely date back to the very inception of 
literature, Frank Kermode detects among contemporary critics an unparal-
leled hostility to both the ethical value of criticism (which, in the past, “was 
extremely important; it could be taught; it was an influence for civilization 
and even for personal amendment”3) and the aesthetic value of literature in 
its own right.4 It might be tempting to see the “turn to ethics” as a kind of 
exorcism of the post- 68 mentality that gave us the slogan of “the death of the 
author” and the rise of symptomatic readings.5 The turn to ethics would be, 
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in this respect, tantamount to a return to the so- called older dispensation. By 
contrast, Wayne C. Booth resists such a nostalgic and potentially reactionary 
move in his 1988 The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, and adopts a 
broader and less exclusionary definition of ethics, not only taking stock of a 
new ethical sensibility sweeping literary studies but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, reading it back into its most trenchant opponents:
I’m thinking here not only of the various new overtly ethical and political 
challenges to “formalism”: by feminist critics asking embarrassing ques-
tions about a male- dominated literary canon and what it has done to the 
“consciousness” of both men and women; by black critics pursuing Paul 
Moses’s kind of question about racism in American classics; by neo- Marxists 
exploring class biases in European literary traditions; by religious critics 
attacking modern literature for its “nihilism” or “atheism.” I am think-
ing more of the way in which even those critics who work hard to purge 
themselves of all but the most abstract formal interests turn out to have an 
ethical program in mind —  a belief that a given way of reading, or a given 
kind of genuine literature, is what will do us most good.6
The following study takes seriously the invitation to adopt a more inclusive 
approach to ethics (one that brings contesting viewpoints together under the 
umbrella of ethical criticism) but remains wary of defining an ethics of reading 
as a commitment to the “most good,” a term at once disarming for its obvi-
ousness (who, among ethical critics, doubts that a literary ethical sensibility 
is beneficial?) and alarming for its vagueness (what is meant by beneficial or 
good?). Reading Unruly: Interpretation and Its Ethical Demands advocates an 
ethics of interpretation that foregrounds fidelity to literature’s unruliness, that 
is, its resistance to hermeneutic mastery, its ungovernable character. Such an 
ethics deviates from the paradigmatic model of Neo- Aristotelian tradition, 
according to which the reader’s ethical task requires the faithful reconstruc-
tion of the beliefs, values, and norms that the author desires to communi-
cate.7 While this tradition emphasizes questions of exemplarity —  the belief 
that literature teaches us through examples and counterexamples —  Reading 
Unruly conceives of fidelity as related less to the interpretation of an artwork’s 
content or message than to the reader’s receptivity and responsiveness to it.
Attesting faithfully to the unruly, and to the “singularity of literature,” to 
borrow Derek Attridge’s suggestive formulation, means vigilantly resisting 
literature’s conflation with moral philosophy. Disentangling a literary work’s 
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ethical concern from its universalist aspiration is perhaps the most distinc-
tive feature of this mode of ethical criticism. An ethics of reading articulated 
in these terms owes much to literary theorists such as Roland Barthes and 
Maurice Blanchot, who constantly underscored literature’s recalcitrance, 
as well as to Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, whose philosophi-
cal work brought about a shift in hermeneutic climate and reorientation of 
ethics toward responsiveness.8 Reading Unruly puts these disparate lines of 
thought into relation with one another in the goal not of harmonizing their 
contradictions but of exploring their productive tensions in an effort to think 
the future of an ethics/aesthetics of difference and its multiple challenges.
What is in contention in debates over the place of alterity and universalism 
in ethical criticism is the paradigmatic status of the face- to- face encounter as 
a fruitful model, or at the very least a source of inspiration, for thinking differ-
ently the relation to the literary. Analogously related to the self ’s exposure to 
the other, characterized in Levinasian terms by excess and opacity, the reader’s 
relation to the work, on this model, takes the form of an “interpellation.”9 In 
the act of reading, the reader confronts a “double bind,” two competing and 
conflicting injunctions. The first is to thematize or make sense of the work’s 
aesthetic otherness —  that is, to adhere to the rules of literary discourse, the 
protocols of commentary. The second, however, is to attend to the work’s 
inventiveness —  its seductive refractoriness —  to recognize that the attempt 
to give meaning and the appeal to contextual markers (cultural, historical, or 
authorial) might very well elucidate aspects of a literary work but can never 
exhaust that meaning nor fully meet or answer its ethical demands. Needless 
to say, the movement between these two injunctions is shot through with 
hesitation. “To find oneself reading an inventive work,” as Attridge puts it, 
“is to find oneself subject to certain obligations —  to respect its otherness, to 
respond to its singularity, to avoid reducing it to the familiar and the utilitarian 
even while attempting to comprehend by relating it to these.”10
The double bind reminds the reader of his or her status as an interpreter. In 
rejecting consumption as a preferred model of reading, the responsive reader 
that emerges from a Levinasian- inspired ethics resembles Barthes’s producer of 
text, a reader who actively engages “writerly” (or scriptible) fiction by becoming 
a willing collaborator in the production of its meaning(s) —  by becoming an 
inventive reader, so to speak.11 Breaking with the consumerist model of reading, 
Barthes calls for the radicalization of the “work of commentary,” so that the 
task of the reader no longer consists in slavishly following the “classic text,” 
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nor in repeating it (via a faithful commentary), but in “manhandl[ing] the 
text, interrupt[ing] it,”12 demystifying its apparent “naturalness” by revealing 
its “constructedness” (its ideological staging of meaning as something trans-
parent and self- evident). More recently, Slavoj Žižek has advanced a similar 
agonistic model of interpretation, deploying the shock of short- circuiting as 
a metaphor for critical reading:
A short circuit occurs when there is a faulty connection in the net-
work —  faulty, of course, from the standpoint of the network’s smooth 
functioning. Is not the shock of short- circuiting, therefore, one of the best 
metaphors for critical reading? Is not one of the most effective critical 
procedures to cross wires that do not usually touch: to take a major classic 
(text, author, notion), and read it in a short- circuiting way, through the 
lens of a “minor” author, text, or conceptual apparatus . . . ? If the minor 
reference is well chosen, such a procedure can lead to insights which com-
pletely shatter and undermine our common perceptions.13
The Žižekian reader performs a symptomatic reading —  a more radicalized 
version of Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” —  challenging the text’s 
surface meaning in order to disclose its blind spots or “unthought.”14 Toward 
that end, the literary text (or any text) is no longer to be conceived in isolation, 
only in terms of its own discourse. Appeals to other fields of study (psycho-
analysis, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, etc.) are particularly welcome, 
since their otherness plays a crucial role in “short- circuiting” the source text.
Žižek’s daring electrician and Barthes’s manhandler of text are both endowed 
with a strong sense of agency —  an agency necessary, in this model, to the 
execution and performance of productive readings. Yet such a model poses 
a number of problems: What or who really gets short- circuited here? Do 
these models not conflate the text as such and dominant interpretations of 
the text (interpretations legitimized by a given interpretive community)? Is 
agency clearly on the side of the reader? Or is it on the side of the inventive 
works —  unruly texts that short- circuit the dogmatic or doctrinal reader?15
In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes can be seen as exploring the latter 
alternative, tying unruliness more closely to literary texts themselves, and 
more specifically, to the different kinds of pleasures that they solicit from 
their readers. For Barthes, the experience of plaisir (pleasure) results from 
a “comfortable practice of reading,”16 a communicable knowledge about the 
reader’s societal values, whereas the experience of jouissance (a sexualized 
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sense of pleasure [from the verb jouir, meaning “to come”] that evokes, at 
once, joy and dismay) “imposes a state of loss”17 by jolting the reader out of 
docility and complacency, out of his or her sense of communal belonging. Yet 
Barthes himself refuses a strict opposition between the two. He maintains that 
the text of pleasure (what he had previously characterized as the “readerly” 
or classic text), or more generally, any experience of aesthetics, holds the 
potential for unruliness, because the idea of pleasure itself —  or rather the 
insistence on pleasure —  “can embarrass the text’s return to morality, to truth: 
to the morality of truth: it is an oblique, a drag anchor, so to speak, without 
which the theory of the text would revert to a centered system, a philosophy of 
meaning.”18 The reader’s taste for pleasure, then, produces cognitive friction, 
blocking the most blatant forms of instrumentalization and commodification: 
literature’s reduction to either scientific- like knowledge or pure didacticism. 
At the same time, however, pleasure and the processes of normalization are 
not, strictly speaking, at odds with one another:
Now the subject who keeps the two texts in his field and in his hands the 
reins of pleasure and bliss is an anachronic subject, for he simultaneously 
and contradictorily participates in the profound hedonism of all culture 
(which permeates him quietly under cover of an art de vivre shared by the 
old books) and in the destruction of that culture: he enjoys the consistency 
of his selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its loss (that is his bliss). 
He is a subject split twice over, doubly perverse.19
Hedonism both perpetuates the principle of identity and calls for its dis-
solution; it sustains and interrupts the subject’s self- sufficiency or conatus 
essendi, the desire to persist in being. For the reader, then, hedonism offers 
the possibility for both socialization (yet another instantiation, albeit a more 
“pleasurable” one, of the process of subjectivization20) and emancipation 
(the possibility of “get[ting] free from oneself ” [se déprendre de soi- même],” 
as Foucault puts it).21 While the concept of the text of jouissance qualifies the 
model of the reader as producer, it does not really break its general mold; 
behind the orgasmic experience of self- dissolution lies a narcissistic reader, 
freely desiring and indulging in eroticized fantasies.22 Unlike the writerly, 
which might be said to please the reader by submitting to his or her phan-
tasms, the unruly, as I have been describing it, interpellates; it solicits from 
the reader an ethical response. Unruly works call upon the reader not only to 
produce and delight in potentially endless interpretations but also to hesitate, 
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to sustain their singularity, and to resist the narcissistic assumption that they 
exist purely for oneself. 23 To put it differently, answerability necessitates an 
alternative mode of reading, one that moves beyond the dualistic, stale model 
of a passive/active consumption.
In The Writing of the Disaster, Maurice Blanchot ostensibly gestures toward 
such a reading:
There is an active, productive way of reading which produces text and reader 
and thus transports us. There is a passive kind of reading which betrays the 
text while appearing to submit to it, by giving the illusion that the text exists 
objectively, fully, sovereignly: as one whole. Finally, there is the reading that 
is no longer passive, but is passivity’s reading. It is without pleasure, without 
joy; it escapes both comprehension and desire. It is like the nocturnal vigil, 
that “inspiring” insomnia when, all having been said, “Saying” [le Dire] is 
heard, and the testimony of the last witness is pronounced.24
Blanchot’s last type of reading —  “passivity’s reading” —  undercuts any 
instrumental relation to the text. His analysis invites us to reevaluate the 
one- dimensional model of reading as consumption but also to question the 
reader’s autonomy and agency (actualized in the pleasurable practice of inter-
pretation, that is, an interpretation without hesitation) and the communicative 
dimension of reading and writing, since the “Saying” of the text is ultimately 
incommensurable with anything said or spoken; it expresses no meaning. 
Recalling Levinas’s philosophy of the other, this uncanny model of read-
ing compels us to reconfigure what it means to care —  to develop a genuine 
openness to textual otherness that is at odds with the ideal of self- care as 
self- mastery.25 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas locates the ethical moment in 
the face- to- face encounter with the other, which he describes as a primordial 
moment of cognitive frustration —  since the other’s face “exceed[s] the idea 
of the other in me” —  that brings into question the autonomy, spontaneity, 
and self- sufficiency of the self.26 The face of the other interrupts the self ’s 
habitual economy, its tendency to reduce otherness to the order of the Same. 
Like Levinas, Blanchot foregrounds the exposure to otherness in his experi-
ence of literature, making it analogous to the Levinasian encounter with the 
face of the other.27 Unruliness, in this inflection, is more or less synonymous 
with pure difference, the anarchic and the non- thematizable. Though appeal-
ing in its alternative approach to literary criticism (criticism as a determina-
tion of textual meaning or an appreciation of a work’s formal features), the 
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emphasis on radical alterity, on that which is putatively beyond or even prior 
to discursivity, threatens to transform the literary work into an unspeakable, 
unknowable, and unassayable mystical Text.28
So is Levinasian otherness truly a viable model for an ethics of the unruly? 
Alain Badiou has taken issue with Levinas’s dominant, cult- like status in ethi-
cal circles, and with his having almost single- handedly framed all of ethical 
discourse in terms of an “ethics of difference” (a category under which he 
lumps together, not unproblematically, multiculturalism, postcolonialism, and 
poststructuralism).29 Badiou scrutinizes, in particular, Levinas’s contention 
that the other is radically other: “The other always resembles me too much 
for the hypothesis of an originary exposure of his alterity to be necessarily 
true.”30 For Levinas, he argues, the source of the other’s radical otherness or 
transcendent alterity must originate elsewhere, in an absolute Other, which 
can, ultimately, only be God: “There can be no ethics without God the inef-
fable” (22). When one tries to secularize Levinas’s ethics of difference, by 
bracketing the divine, as it were, the result is simply a “decomposed religion,” 
worth no more than “dog’s dinner [de la bouillie pour les chats]” (23). Such 
an ethics of difference treats all others as others abstractly and formally, but 
in practice distinguishes between others who resemble oneself and those 
who do not. As Badiou puts it, “This celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if 
he is a good other. . . . That is to say: I respect differences, but only, of course, 
in so far as that which differs also respects, just as I do, the said differences” 
(24). Pace Levinas, Badiou makes the recognition of the Same central to 
the ethical act, and ties ethics to truth, “the coming- to- be of that which is 
not yet” (27):
The whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other should 
be purely and simply abandoned. For the real question —  and it is an 
extraordinarily difficult one —  is much more that of recognizing the Same. . . . 
The Same, in effect, is not what is (i.e. the infinite multiplicity of differ-
ences) but what comes to be. I have already named that in regard to which 
only the advent of the Same occurs: it is a truth. Only a truth is, as such, 
indifferent to differences. (25, 27)31
Truth takes the form of a commitment, a response to the demand of what 
Badiou calls an “event”: it is “the real process of fidelity to an event” (42).32
Receptivity and response to the event are inextricably linked for Badiou. 
In an ethical framework that is uncannily reminiscent of Levinas’s, Badiou’s 
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notion of “event,” which he associates with the Lacanian Real (52), can be 
described as a situated experience of the unruly: the disorganizing and deroutin-
izing alterity of the event reveals a “void” in the order of being (the Symbolic 
order), involving an interpellation (the becoming- subject of the event) and 
an unending task of responsibility (the ethical subject’s subsequent “fidel-
ity” to this “crack in the ontological edifice of the universe,” to recall Žižek’s 
language quoted in the epigraph).33 “To be really faithful to the event,” writes 
Badiou, “I must completely rework my ordinary way of living my situation” 
(41– 42). While the truth- event is open to all, Badiou insists on its irreducible 
singularity and the incommunicability of its meaning: “What arises from a 
truth- process . . . cannot be communicated. . . . To enter into the composition 
of a subject of truth can only be something that happens to you. Confirmation 
of the point is provided by the concrete circumstances in which someone is 
seized by a fidelity” (47). Žižek perceives an ironic affinity between Badiou 
and Levinas on this point: “Does Badiou, the anti- Levinas, with this topic of 
the respect for the unnameable, not come dangerously close precisely to the 
Levinasian notion of the respect for Otherness?”34
Whereas Žižek sees in Badiou unfortunate lapses into Levinasianism, I 
propose to read Badiou against the grain, to read Badiou with Levinas, and to 
pursue an alternative basis for their rapprochement, one that passes through 
Derrida’s encounter with Levinas before returning to the demands of fidelity. 
In “Violence and Metaphysics,” an earlier, and more generous, engagement 
with Levinas’s thought (one that predates Badiou’s by three decades), Derrida 
similarly called into question Levinas’s ethics of difference, disputing “the 
dream of a purely heterological thought,” “a pure thought of pure difference.”35 Yet 
Derrida does not dismiss Levinas’s radical project. Quite the contrary: while 
scrupulously exposing Levinas’s dependence on a philosophical discourse that 
he claims to have left behind, Derrida nevertheless argues that the question 
is not one of choosing between “the opening and the totality,”36 infinity and 
sameness. Refusing either/or logic, Derrida prefers to hesitate between the 
two in response to the challenge of Levinasian philosophy. Adopting instead 
a logic of both/and, Derrida works through and against Levinas’s philosophy, 
insisting on the relationality of the other. Though there is always something 
surprising about the other, something “wholly other [tout autre],”37 a pure 
or unmediated encounter with the other remains something of a phantasm. 
And to be sure, we find Derrida, at times, all too enthralled by this phantasm 
of a “pure ethics”:
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Pure ethics, if there is any, begins with the respectable dignity of the other 
as absolute unlike, recognized as nonrecognizable, indeed as unrecogniz-
able, beyond all knowledge, all cognition and all recognition: far from 
being the beginning of pure ethics, the neighbor as like or as resembling, 
as looking like, spells the end or the ruin of such an ethics, if there is any.38
Yet we must pay sufficient attention to Derrida’s self- puncturing moments of 
doubt, such as the one above, where Derrida entertains thoughts of a pure 
ethics while qualifying such remarks with the repetition of the words “if there 
is any” —  drawing attention, as it were, to the phantasmatic character of a 
“pure ethics.” Relationality rather than absolute separation conditions my 
relation to the other. Abraham’s asymmetrical relation to God exemplifies 
what Derrida paradoxically characterizes as a “relation without relation,” a 
“rapport sans rapport.”39 “What can be said about Abraham’s relation to God 
can be said about my relation without relation to every other (one) as every (bit) 
other [tout autre comme tout autre], in particular my relation to my neighbor 
or my loved ones who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent as 
Jahweh.”40 Perplexingly entailing both a relation and a nonrelation to the other, 
this relationless relation joins and disjoins. It answers the aporetic demands 
made upon me by the other: to be understood without being reduced to an 
object of comprehension, to never dissolve the “without” of the “relation 
without relation” that interrupts any traditional, static subject- object relation 
of knowledge and that respects (by sustaining through discourse) the enig-
maticity and irreducibility of the other. Derrida’s ethics (of the relationless 
relation), as Gayatri Spivak incisively notes, is “not a problem of knowledge 
but a call of relationship (without relationship, as limit case).”41 Denoting 
more than an epistemological impasse, ethics is an exposure to the demands 
of the other, that is, an invitation for interpretation.
In his later philosophical masterwork, Otherwise than Being, Levinas implic-
itly responds to the concerns Derrida expressed in “Violence and Metaphysics,” 
moving away from the face- to- face encounter as the paradigmatic ethical scene 
to the question of language and the possibility of ethical figuring. Levinas comes 
to realize that the ethical can signify within the realm of representation, that 
the language of ontology does not preclude nor exhaust what Levinas calls the 
“ethical Saying” (in this respect, Blanchot’s evocation of the “Saying” in The 
Writing of the Disaster might register a different meaning). Contrasting Saying 
(le Dire) with the Said (le Dit) —  “the birth place of ontology”42 —  Levinas 
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argues that saying “is not a modality of cognition” (48) nor an “exchange of 
information” (92). Reminiscent of the “phatic” function of language in its 
insistence on intersubjectivity —  the contact between speaker and addressee 
without the transfer of information —  Saying expresses nothing but the desire 
to communicate.43 Levinas is aware, however, of the paradox that as soon as 
one utters something, once meaning happens, one enters into the domain 
of the Said. Yet he does not stop there. Refusing the false choice between 
Saying and the Said, between pure alterity and comprehension, respect and 
violence, Levinas advocates a kind of skepticism, an “endless critique” (44) 
or “an incessant unsaying of the said [un incessant dédit du Dit]” (181). The 
unruliness of the Saying, then, invariably passes through the scene of language; 
its anarchic character is not obliterated (domesticated) but preserved and 
rearticulated through the activities of interpretation and rereading.44
In a similar vein, Derrida urges us to go beyond the stagnant, predictable 
debate over sameness and difference, pointing out that relating ethically to 
otherness or alterity should not lead to either a cannibalistic (purely assimila-
tive) or a noncannibalistic (purely indigestible) mode of contact: “The moral 
question is . . . not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not eat . . . but 
since one must eat in any case . . . how for goodness sake should one eat well 
[bien manger]?”45 Reframing the terms of the ethical debate, Derrida insists 
that fidelity to the other will always bring with it a sense of betrayal, since 
fidelity as such does not lie in refusing the Said in order to dwell only in the 
idyllic time of the Saying, but in the ethical exigency to unsay and resay the 
Said —  to perpetually “eat better.”46
Extrapolating from Derrida’s comments, I would argue that the notion of 
eating well serves as a more fitting metaphor for ethical criticism, an ethically 
preferable hermeneutic mode through which to assess the inventive work. 
First of all, it helps move beyond the early reception of Levinas in literary 
studies, which always risked moral sentimentalism by reducing the disruptive 
Levinasian encounter with the other to a series of predictable, familiar, and 
easily translatable pathetic scenes. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
notion of eating well gestures to an understanding of and engagement with 
the aesthetic unruly that take the form of a response.47 Creatively hesitating 
between incommensurable demands (to interpret but not to translate back 
into familiar terms), the ethical reader is invited to cultivate an appreciation 
for the unruly, to curb his or her desire for hermeneutic mastery (a desire 
that finds its origins in the Symbolic Order and the voracious appetite for 
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consumption that it propagates) without simultaneously renouncing meaning 
or the interpretive endeavor.48 Doing justice to the unruly both acknowl-
edges and endlessly works to counter this desire to master, comprehend, or 
pin down a work’s meaning.49 Reading itself becomes a desire for more, a 
transgressive desire not to arrest but to prolong the act of interpretation. As 
such, interpretation, then, can be described as “imperfect” in the etymologi-
cal sense of incomplete, “foreign to the category of completion,” as Blanchot 
notes in his musings on “fragmentary speech” in The Infinite Conversation.50
Reading unruly is obviously also a learned behavior (“how we read” mat-
ters as much as “what we read”51), and does not constitute in any way a more 
“natural” ethico- aesthetic disposition toward literature (what a timeless ethics 
of reading presupposes). To fail to see reading as a historically and cultur-
ally specific practice is to fall prey to ideology. In seeing works as unruly we 
must not ignore the reconstructive or belated quality of such a recognition.52 
Moreover, unruliness as such is not located in the text, ready to be deciphered 
by its faithful reader; it is not an immanent or formal property of the literary 
work, connoting, for instance, its essential ambiguity (as in New Criticism). 
Nor is it adequately understood as an incommunicable sublime or epiphanic 
moment of a truth event (Badiou’s version of the Real).53 On the latter, Žižek 
offers a suggestive alternative, redefining the Real in terms of the parallax 
gap. If parallax is commonly understood as “the apparent displacement of an 
object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in 
observational position,” for Žižek, the parallax gap signifies far more, enabling 
him to reconceptualize the interpretive scene itself. As he puts it,
The philosophical twist to be added [to the standard definition of paral-
lax] . . . is that the observed difference is not simply “subjective,” due to 
the fact that the same object which exists “out there” is seen from two 
different stances, or points of view. It is rather that . . . subject and object 
are inherently “mediated,” so that an “epistemological” shift in the subject’s 
point of view always reflects an “ontological” shift in the object itself.54
Reading Lacan with Hegel, and Hegel with Lacan, Žižek conceives of the dia-
lectic as an ongoing process involving a constant shift in perspective between 
two points “between which no synthesis or mediation is possible” (4): indeed, 
the parallax gap reveals that “there is no common language, no shared ground” 
(5) on or through which such a synthesis or mediation could take place.
The notion of the parallax view has led Žižek to clarify his own understanding 
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of the function of the Real; no longer conceived as that which “always returns 
to its place,” the Lacanian Real is now better understood as the gap between 
appearances, something —  or rather a “nonsubstantial” thing —  that is tri-
angulated or retroactively reconstructed through the interpretive work of 
analysis and critique (26). Žižek explicitly distances the parallax gap from 
Badiou’s notion of the event, accusing Badiou of binary thought, stressing 
that “there is nothing but the order of Being” (167), that the event as such is 
constitutive of the order of Being.
Recalling Derrida’s now infamous —  but often misunderstood —  “there is 
nothing outside of the text [il n’y pas de hors- texte],”55 we can agree with Žižek 
that, analogously, there is no outside the order of Being if by “no outside the 
order of Being,” one means that the event is profoundly relational, even if (or 
because) it is a strain on relationality. That is, in the exposure to the event, one, 
strictly speaking, does not have a relation to Being nor a nonrelation to Being. 
Parallactic thinking, in its constant oscillation between incommensurable 
perspectives, fosters a Derridean mode of interpretation that helps to sustain 
the “without” of the “relation without relation,” that is, the double bind of 
the ethical relation.56 The double bind of ethical criticism can thus be reread 
dialectically in terms of the parallax gap:57 the two injunctions informing our 
exposure to the aesthetic object (both not to compromise and to compromise 
on the singularity of the aesthetic work) share no common language. The “Real” 
of the literary work, so to speak, resides in this parallax gap.
Taking seriously Badiou’s ethical call to “persevere in the interruption” 
(47) thus requires a more robust understanding of the unruliness of the event 
and of the ethical demands it imposes on its faithful subjects. Unruliness, 
indistinguishable from the experience of unruliness, does not exist outside 
interpretive communities, but is generated by them and contributes as well 
to their “engine of change,”58 compelling unsatisfied readers to think with 
and beyond their existing protocols of interpretation and current norms 
of readability. What is at the heart of this dissatisfaction is an unruly will to 
know/enjoy, a curiosity that the event of reading does not so much create 
ex nihilo as accentuate and enable. It is a type of curiosity that disrupts the 
economy of the Same, the reduction of the new to the familiar. It is a “passion 
for knowledge,” as Foucault aptly put it, that does not seek “to assimilate what 
it is proper for one to know” but results in the “straying afield” of oneself, 
effectively disrupting the sovereignty and centrality of the knowing self.59 
In this respect, curiosity would lead not only to a sense of empowerment (I 
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want to know) but also to one of vulnerability and heteronomy (the object 
of knowledge is irreducible to me). Curiosity, and the kind of knowledge (or 
truth, in Badiou’s terms) it generates, introduces a critical distance between 
the reader and his or her interpretive community: to be a curious reader is to 
remain always open to the event of reading, to the surprising and “incalculable 
novelty” of its truth.60 Curiosity, then, functions as an antidote to interpretive 
conformism, opening the possibility, even if momentarily, for “no longer being, 
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”61 With curiosity also comes a 
sense of care, an eye for the unruly:
Curiosity . . . evokes “care” [souci]; it evokes the care [soin] one takes of 
what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one 
that is never immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds 
us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of 
thought and to look at the same things in a different way; a passion for 
seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack of respect 
for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental.62
A readiness to find in literary works strangeness and unfamiliarity, or what 
we might describe as an unruly care for the unruly, is a sine qua non for 
experiencing aesthetic jouissance.
Like the just judge —  whose legal judgment, as Derrida points out, does 
not simply consist of “applying the law” like “a calculating machine”63 but 
requires that each decision be the result of an invention64 —  the curious reader/
the subject of aesthetic pleasure confronts, and returns to, each book as a 
singularity, answering its interpellation as reader- judge, its call for “an abso-
lutely unique interpretation.”65 Ethical exigency is not a hermeneutic necessity; 
ethics emerges precisely in the absence of interpretive certainty.66 Yet, to be 
clear, what an inventive work elicits from its reader is not a dismissal of all 
prior commentaries (an attempt to read a work in a historical vacuum), but 
a recognition of the reader’s infinite responsibility as an interpretive subject. 
And to borrow from Badiou’s example of Saint Paul, who, as a faithful subject 
of the event of Christ’s resurrection, enacts his fidelity to its truth by preach-
ing the Word (“there is no longer Jew nor Greek”) to all, readers of literature 
can be said to perform their fidelity to the event of reading, which coincides 
with the coming- into- being of the inventive work as such, not in isolation 
(the original, quasi- private scene of reading —  the dyadic encounter of reader 
and work) but in the public, shared act of interpretation.67
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What motivates a reader to respond to an inventive work —  to justify his 
or her reading to others —  is undoubtedly multiple. The works I have selected 
all figure among the most frequently reprinted, studied, and commented 
works in French literature. This choice might be said both to stem from and 
to reinforce existing literary canons, leaving unquestioned their ideological 
complicity in the production of “cultural capital.” As Pierre Bourdieu has aptly 
demonstrated, canon watch, the dutiful patrolling of the “magical division” 
separating high from low art, and the “cultural consecration” afforded by it,68 
performs, intentionally or unintentionally, “a social function of legitimat-
ing social differences.”69 It is true that the literary —  and in some cases the 
philosophical —  worth of the selected works is (currently) beyond dispute. 
Literary critics and humanities professors must therefore be cognizant that 
the promotion and teaching of such canonical works frequently serve, again 
consciously or unconsciously, as “strategies of distinction,”70 inculcating in 
students, or readers more generally, not only a love for high culture but also 
a sense of cultural superiority. Yet to give attention only to this, to warn solely 
against an investment in and a perpetuation of the literary canon, would 
be to miss a fundamental point of the book. Unruly works make demands 
on all readers: from neophytes to the most seasoned interpreters of litera-
ture, from students to professors to critics.71 Refusing both their idolatry 
and instrumentalization, unruly works stubbornly insist that their readers 
constantly question and reevaluate their readerly habitus or hermeneutic 
parti pris.72 In this respect, affirming the canonical status of these works in 
any straightforward manner —  either by making them an unchanging “sure 
and safe repository of the values of Western culture”73 (what hegemonic 
cultural norms of distinction presuppose and promote), or, as we shall see 
more closely, by seeing them simply as representative of a particular period 
or movement —  would be antithetical to our project, since it would func-
tion only to further their monumentalization, to contain and domesticate 
their un- ruly and profoundly inventive force, disciplining and curtailing, by 
extension, their readers’ curiosity.74
This book constitutes a series of case studies, responses to the challenges 
of thinking the ethical in/as aesthetics. The selected works demonstrate the 
multiplicity of the unruly, the differing ways in which unruliness manifests itself 
across genres and in relation to varying and rivaling horizons of interpreta-
tion marking different historical periods. In this sense, my choice represents 
only a sample of the many texts who share an ability to provoke an ethical 
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response through their inventiveness, an ability to render the familiar unfa-
miliar —  and, conversely, the unfamiliar familiar. My choice is not random, 
however, in that I focus on works that point up the way in which a shared 
intellectual history cannot fully account for or exhaust a particular text’s 
unique figuration of the ethical double bind: the need both to understand 
and respect the singularity of a literary work. Each unruly work stages the 
ethical scene in unique and subtle ways, inciting us to engage in the act of 
interpretation, to prolong the moment of meaning- making. Moreover, this 
incitement is itself felt differently; texts that foster readerly identification, that 
seemingly welcome explication, exert the force of the double bind in ways that 
remain distinct from, but equally important as, the techniques deployed by 
those works that explicitly frustrate interpretation through their modernist, 
non- mimetic or deliberately opaque form.
Chapter 1 takes up the conjunctions and frictions between philosophy, 
theory, and the literary through an examination of Michel de Montaigne’s 
sixteenth- century Essays. As a work of accidental theory, the Essays inaugurate 
a new type of philosophy: an unruly philosophy and a philosophy of the unruly 
made possible through the essay form itself. Exceeding any strict generic defini-
tion, the essay operates as a mode of reading that emerges from, and helps to 
sustain, Montaigne’s desire to think differently, to read otherwise than being. As 
a mode of inquiry, essayistic thinking privileges a productive skepticism that 
affords a different way of apprehending alterity —  his own and that of others. 
The essay unavoidably imposes form on Montaigne’s “unruly fantasies” but 
a form that relentlessly refuses its own homogenization, illustrating but also 
performing the elusive, fluctuating, and imperfect character of the self that 
frustrates metaphysical permanence, ontological stability, or any sense of 
completion. Focusing on Montaigne’s essaying of the self in its relation to the 
other, this chapter explores the Essays as and through parallax, the dialectical 
triangulation that the work itself both performs and demands of its readers.
Chapter 2 further interrogates the demands that an artwork makes of its 
readers by turning to the concept of the “book as friend” in Denis Diderot’s 
eighteenth- century fictional dialogue, Rameau’s Nephew. Diderot’s dialogue 
between author- narrator- philosopher (referred to as “Moi,” or “Me”) and 
his interlocutor, the morally depraved nephew (“Lui,” or “Him”), ostensibly 
stages an allegory of the mind- and- body problem, a self- critical philosophical 
debate between Cartesian idealism (the philosopher’s disembodied mind) 
and eighteenth- century materialism (the nephew’s hungry body). Yet this 
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Enlightenment dialogue reveals itself to be less concerned with arriving at 
a moral lesson than first expected. Presenting its readers an unstable, dis-
torted, and maddening moral universe, Rameau’s Nephew invites but also 
frustrates readerly desire for friendship, the desire to identify (with) the 
storyteller’s ethos. To whom is the dialogue most hospitable? The reader’s 
sympathy hesitates between the philosopher —  the defender of moral val-
ues (and status quo) —  and the cynical, lazy, and seemingly “mad” nephew, 
philosophy’s excluded other. Accommodating a series of divergent readings 
without ever fully endorsing any, Rameau’s Nephew effectively short- circuits 
its own philosophical subtext, and thwarts its own allegorical mechanisms. 
Reading Diderot’s dialogue in light of the mind- and- body problem, then, 
does not so much privilege a philosophical approach to the artwork (as yet 
another eighteenth- century interpretation of the Cartesian problematic) as 
foreground the work’s unruliness, its heteroclite and dislocating character: 
its status as both a familiar product of Enlightenment philosophy and some-
thing foreign to it.
If the unruliness of Rameau’s Nephew resides in its elusive authorial voice 
and refusal to serve as an illustration of either Enlightenment discourse 
or its counterdiscourse, Charles Baudelaire’s nineteenth- century writings 
make the unruly an aesthetic category of sorts. With Baudelaire’s neologism 
modernité —  “the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, 
the other being the eternal and the immutable”75 —  the unruly undergoes a 
radical transvaluation, becoming coterminous with the aesthetic experience: 
to be modern is to be unruly. Chapter 3 investigates Baudelaire’s theorization 
and practice of modernité (translatable both as modernity and modernism), 
his engagement with translation as a means for challenging understandings 
about poetry and reality and, more urgently, for thinking differently about 
the experience and framing of modern life. The visual arts, especially paint-
ing and caricature, provided Baudelaire with valuable insights into modernité 
that he sought, in turn, to translate into poetic language. For Baudelaire, 
visual art did not simply help mediate his perception of modern life; it also 
pointed to the violence and limits of translatability, serving as a parallax, 
elucidating the gap between modern life and its aestheticized image. In his 
later prose poems, collected in The Spleen of Paris, Baudelaire committed 
himself to elucidating this ideological gap for his reading public. Through 
his playful, self- critical, and inventive use of irony, Baudelaire contested 
the modernist belief in the “autonomy of aesthetics,” exposing its dubious 
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separation of art and its material source (implicating himself in the process), 
while simultaneously disrupting his audience’s relentless thirst for interpre-
tive pleasure and moral guidance.
Chapter 4 follows the developing and vexed relationship between author 
and reader in Jean- Paul Sartre’s 1938 novel Nausea. From its very inception 
Nausea has been intimately linked to Sartrean philosophy. The novel has been 
said to highlight, through Roquentin’s drama, something timeless about the 
existential condition, the absurdity of life, and the ultimate meaninglessness 
of the world (Sartre had conceived of the novel as a “factum on Contin-
gency”). Critics writing in the aftermath of the “death of the author” have 
begun to complicate the relationship between Nausea and its author, refus-
ing to submit it to an “author function” —  that is, to make it “fit” into the 
larger, coherent “thought” of Sartre. Yet refusing to read Nausea from within 
a hermeneutic horizon determined by existential phenomenology need not 
result in a disavowal of the artwork’s existentialist qualities. A responsive and 
responsible encounter with Nausea cannot simply jettison an engagement 
with its author, nor can it simply submit to Sartre’s authorial authority, to 
either his early philosophy or his later self- critical assessment of Nausea in 
his autobiography The Words. This chapter instead reads Nausea as Sartre’s 
unruly progeny. Confirming and “countersigning” Sartre —  reading his novel 
with an eye for narrative moments that both reiterate and displace Sartrean 
understanding76 —  opens up the possibility for a different encounter with 
the work, one that makes Nausea less readable but more inventive, one that 
is less strictly faithful to its ideas but more responsive to its provocations.
The nouveau roman (New Novel) is the focus of chapters 5 and 6. Alain 
Robbe- Grillet’s novel Jealousy, in many ways, can be said to illustrate Robbe- 
Grillet’s modernist, if not postmodernist, bias against meaning, realism, and 
narration, captured by his observation that “to tell a story has become strictly 
impossible.”77 Offering these remarks in his influential manifesto For a New 
Novel, Robbe- Grillet made clear his intention to renovate both the novel 
form and the critical reading practices used in approaching the genre as a 
whole. Robbe- Grillet’s radical contestation did not, however, simply provide 
readers with a new interpretive paradigm; the question of how one can or 
should interpret Jealousy’s formal strategies, its explicit rebuke of hermeneutic 
containment and cognitive mastery, still remains open. The question of how 
to respond to the Saying of Jealousy —  a question of readerly responsibility 
that the novel itself allegorizes or stages in several key scenes —  is not just 
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an intellectual or epistemological challenge but also an ethical one. Finally, 
chapter 6 considers the gendering of unruliness in Marguerite Duras’s The 
Ravishing of Lol Stein, a novel that radically rewrites the male fantasy narrative 
about female trauma or madness, questioning the role of gendered experi-
ence in the interpretive process. Attending to the intersubjective demands 
of the novel, its figuration of the ethical within and through language, this 
chapter highlights the work’s inventiveness for feminism: the ways it elicits 
and frustrates familiar, utilitarian, or overdetermined responses to sexual 
difference. More specifically, the chapter reframes the terms of the debate 
surrounding The Ravishing of Lol Stein, asking to what extent a faithful femi-
nist reading depends on the reader’s ability to share Lol’s “experience,” and 
to what extent the complexity of the male narrator’s writing of Lol —  that 
is, his writing of her ravishing and the ravishing of his writing —  resists or 
exceeds any straightforward identification with the female character or with 
the “feminine” more generally.
The analyses that follow do not aim, of course, to exhaust an understanding 
of unruliness. Nor do they offer a hermeneutic key for unlocking the unruliness 
of any other text. Quite the opposite, the book offers itself as an apprentice-
ship in the unruly. There is no theory of the unruly; the unruly cannot be 
determined in advance. It can only be grasped, or better yet, encountered 
through examples. The study also takes to heart Montaigne’s observation 
that “every example is lame [tout exemple cloche],”78 that every model (every 
prior example or precedent) is always to some degree deficient in explaining 
or accounting for the meaning of the specific case at hand. Montaigne’s self- 
critical assessment —  his implicit refusal to present himself as exemplary, a 
model for imitation —  could be paired with Derrida’s hyperbolic ethical utter-
ance “tout autre est tout autre.”79 Derrida’s phrase contains within it a double 
meaning; it can be translated as either “every other is completely other” or 
“every other is every other.” But again, it is not a question of simply choos-
ing between the two meanings. The sentence’s aporetic character demands a 
parallactic reading. Likewise, each unruly work is radically singular, and yet 
each work shares the identity of singularity, of unruliness. Conceptualizing 
the relation to the unruly as a “relation without relation” renders problematic 
the choice between pure otherness or pure sameness, and serves to block or 
forestall the (illusory) hermeneutic security that the copula “is” (the unruly 
work is.  .  .) might provide. Each case study can be said to exemplify the 
unruly, while simultaneously resisting the imposition of the constraining logic 
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of exemplarity (where an account of the unruly is made to stand for other 
instances or, more precisely, readings of the unruly). Such a formulation of 
the (non)exemplarity of case studies foregrounds an understanding of the 
literary as an inappropriable alterity —  with the ethical imperative to sustain 
this alterity through the work of interpretation. Recognizing the lameness 
of every reading thus goes hand in hand with recognizing the singularity of 
the work interpreted. Such a recognition does not result in paralysis or star-
vation (in a denial of the reader’s will to know/interpret), nor in aesthetic 
and epistemological relativism (an uncritical reiteration of the truism that 
“all readings are misreadings”), but in the testing of readings and the fragile 
promise of eating well.
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Montaigne
The Accidental Theorist
Theory . . . has no vested interests inasmuch as it never lays 
claim to an absolute system, a non- ideological formulation 
of itself and its “truths”; indeed, always itself complicit in the 
being of current language, it has only the never- finished task 
and vocation of undermining philosophy as such, of unraveling 
affirmative statements and propositions of all kinds.
Fredric Jameson
After reflecting on the limits of man’s cognitive powers in a key passage from 
the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” Michel de Montaigne turns his atten-
tion to himself, taking stock of his own practice and its potential effects on 
future generations:
Having found by experience that where one man had failed, another has suc-
ceeded, and that what was unknown to one century the following century 
has made clear, and that the sciences and arts are not cast in a mold, but 
are formed and shaped little by little, by repeated handling and polishing, 
as the bears lick their cubs into shape at leisure, I do not leave off sounding 
and testing what my powers cannot discover; and by handling again and 
kneading this new matter, stirring it and heating it, I open up to whoever 
follows me some facility to enjoy it more at his ease, and make it more 
supple and manageable for him.
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Ayant essayé par experience que ce à quoy l’un s’estoit failly, l’autre y est 
arrivé, et ce qui estoit incogneu à un siecle, le siecle suyvant l’a esclaircy, 
et que les sciences et les arts ne se jettent pas en moule, ains se forment 
et figurent peu à peu en les maniant et pollissant à plusieurs fois, comme 
les ours façonnent leurs petits en les lechant à loisir: ce que ma force ne 
peut descouvrir, je ne laisse pas de le sonder et essayer; et, en retastant et 
pétrissant cette nouvelle matiere, la remuant et l’eschaufant, j’ouvre à celuy 
qui me suit quelque facilité pour en jouir plus à son ayse, et le luy rends 
plus souple et plus maniable.1
As the product of “experience” and “essaying,” Montaigne’s “new matter” 
denotes at once his self and his book. It represents his contribution to the 
existing and ever expanding body of human knowledge, his own response to 
the Delphic injunction to “know thyself,” as well as the material product of his 
intellectual labor. Montaigne’s “new matter” —  which reminds us of his address 
to the reader (“I am the matter of my book” [“je suis moy- mesme la matiere 
de mon livre”]) —  will then be passed on to his readers to come, “whoever 
follows [him].” This process is not absent of authorial anxieties, however. Not 
unlike a child who leaves home to go out into the world, the printed book of 
the Essays attains a degree of autonomy and eventually comes to lie outside 
the hermeneutic control of its father. Montaigne already hints at an uncanny 
dissymmetry between himself and his book (his child of the mind):
Even in my own writings I do not always find again the sense of my first 
thought; I do not know what I meant to say. (II, 12, 425– 26b)
[My book] may know a good many things that I no longer know and hold 
from me what I have not retained and what, just like a stranger, I should 
have to borrow from it if I came to need it. If I am wiser than it, it is richer 
than I. (II, 8, 293c, emphasis added)
En mes escris memes, je ne retrouve pas tousjours l’air de ma premiere 
imagination: je ne scay ce que j’ay voulu dire. (566)
[Mon livre] peut sçavoir assez de choses que je ne sçay plus, et tenir de moy 
ce que je n’ay point retenu et qu’il faudroit que, tout ainsi qu’un estranger, 
j’empruntasse de luy, si besoin m’en venoit. Il est plus riche que moy, si je 
suis plus sage que luy. (401– 2)
Montaigne’s book is his, yet it is also like a stranger to him: it is him and not him.
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It is not surprising, then, that Montaigne expressed concern about his 
reception. This chapter considers several questions first posed by the essayist 
himself. Would the Essays be read as an “inventive work,” as a work that elicits 
creative responses from its readers? Would the audience heed the author’s 
call to be read and understood (“I am hungry to make myself known” [III, 
5, 643b] [“Je suis affamé de me faire connoistre” (847)])? And more impor-
tantly, would they do justice to the singularity of his work —  “the only book 
in the world of its kind” [II, 8, 278c] [“le seul livre au monde de son espece” 
(385)], as Montaigne describes it? Everything hinges on the readers’ refusal 
to impose an unequivocal meaning (what would amount to casting his mat-
ter in a rigid mold). Or to put it in more positive terms: it all depends on 
readers’ openness to the author’s essayistic process, on their recognition 
of and contribution to Montaigne’s Pygmalion- like project of bringing his 
philosophical work to life.2
The Essay: Between History and Philosophy
It is now a commonplace to acknowledge the “newness” and singularity of 
Montaigne’s work in crediting him as the father of the essay, this extraordinary 
hybrid genre that has appealed so well to readers’ hunger for both substance 
and style. With the creation of the unruly essay, Montaigne did not simply 
make famous a particular style of writing but also inaugurated a mode of 
thinking intimately tied to the values of irresolution, wonder, and surprise. 
Contingency rather than necessity guides the unfolding of Montaigne’s writ-
ing: “My conceptions and my judgment move only by groping, staggering, 
stumbling, and blundering” (I, 26, 107a) [“Mes conceptions et mon juge-
ment ne marche qu’à tastons, chancelant, bronchant et chopant” (146)]. 
Though they constantly probe the “inner springs” (II, 17, 481a) [“les resorts” 
(634)] of his mind, Montaigne’s meditations yield no concrete foundational 
knowledge. Purposive inquiry is met at every turn with textual resistance; 
indeed, an irreducible gap between intention and outcome structures the 
writings of the Essays —  “I do not find myself in the place where I look; and 
I find myself more by chance encounter than by searching my judgment” (I, 
10, 26– 27c) [“Je ne me trouve pas où je me cherche; et me trouve plus par 
rencontre que par l’inquisition de mon jugement” (40)] —  prefiguring, as 
it were, Lacan’s anti- Cartesian claim, “I think where I am not, therefore I am 
where I do not think.”3
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Philosophers and critical theorists have long recognized the disruptive 
potential of the essay form, especially as practiced by Montaigne. Once 
described by Theodor Adorno as “the critical force par excellence,” the essay 
“gently defies the ideals of clara et distincta perceptio and of absolute cer-
tainty.”4 Michel Foucault also recognizes the essay’s contestative impulse and 
its distrust of authoritative discourses. The essay —  “the living substance of 
philosophy” —  does not legitimate “what is already known” but rather desires 
to know “to what extent it might be possible to think differently.”5 Liberating 
in an oblique, rather than straightforward way, the essay works to expand 
thought and to create new ways of thinking: it unavoidably imposes form 
on thought but a kind of form that relentlessly refuses its own homogeniza-
tion as it tries to think both beyond its own cognitive limits and against the 
dogmatic “image of thought”6 of any given historical period. As a mode of 
philosophical discourse, essayistic thinking clearly exceeds a strict formalistic 
definition of the essay. More than an approach to written thought, the essay 
is a mode of reading reflecting a desire to know “to what extent it might be 
possible” to read differently.
Yet as Montaignian critics with an eye for history continue to remind us, 
the late sixteenth- century writer was working with a somewhat different, 
historically specific concept, that of “essays.” In fact, we are arguably being 
unfaithful to his use of the term when we refer to each chapter of the Essays 
as an essay. “Publications à l’essai,” or trial publications, as George Hoffmann 
points out, “did not so much constitute a genre as foster a provisional status 
for their writers.”7 Hoffmann’s observation does not just clarify the histori-
cal origins of a contemporary term, however. It hints at the larger fault lines 
distinguishing prevalent approaches to the Essays, and the essayistic process, 
within the field of Montaigne scholarship. In his 2007 book, How to Read 
Montaigne, Terence Cave explores such lines, explicitly addressing the her-
meneutic pitfalls facing any reader of the Essays. For Cave, the interpretive 
dilemma turns on the split consciousness that an author like Montaigne 
demands of his audience.
A . . . fundamental question is whether we are to read the Essais primarily 
as a product of late Renaissance humanism, steeped in the cultural habits 
of that period, or as already a remarkably modern work. The answer is 
that it is both, and that any viable reading will need to see both aspects, 
shuttling between them as between the duck and the rabbit in the famous 
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trick picture that Wittgenstein discusses in the Philosophical Investigations 
(a drawing that can be seen as the head of either a duck or a rabbit but not 
both at the same time).8
Reading Montaigne, according to Cave, does not simply entail choosing 
between a historically sensitive reading of Montaigne’s Essays or adopting a 
contemporary theoretical lens when interpreting his work. A “viable read-
ing” must acknowledge both. The duck/rabbit metaphor adds a further layer 
of complexity, since a harmonious account of the two is, strictly speaking, 
impossible: you cannot see both the duck and the rabbit at the same time. 
Yet Cave does qualify somewhat his observation, affirming the ideality of 
its simultaneous representation: “Ideally, one would present the duck and 
the rabbit as a single creature, but that isn’t possible in the linear mode of 
expository prose.”9 It is unclear whether Cave means that it isn’t possible to 
visually capture the Essays as a “singular creature” given the confinement of 
the series (How to Read) under which the monograph appears. More likely, 
Cave is alluding here to the general problem of commentary and its inevitable 
betrayal of any text that it seeks to elucidate.
While the argument that we must not conflate the historical Montaigne 
and our modern version of him is quite appealing, the hermeneutic value of 
the duck/rabbit metaphor —  especially when its aporetic structure is, ide-
ally, surmountable —  requires more scrutiny. Cave’s argument echoes and 
updates in certain respects earlier debates about the limits of historicism. 
As François Rigolot put it in an intervention on this subject, the charge of 
anachronism should not give the accuser a false sense of hermeneutic security, 
since any critic must avoid not only anachronism (the “aberrant projection 
of the present onto the past”) but also catachronism (the “equally aberrant 
illusion that one can capture the past without regard for the present that is 
conditioning that capture”).10 Anachronism is indeed constitutive of any 
reading of a historically distant author, so to read Montaigne today is to read 
him anachronistically.11
Montaigne himself did not seem disturbed by this interpretive reality; he 
readily acknowledged this practice, even praising its effects:
An able reader often discovers in other men’s writings perfections beyond 
those that the author put in or perceived, and lends them richer meanings 
and aspects. (I, 24, 93a)
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Un suffisant lecteur descouvre souvant és escrits d’autruy des perfections 
autres que celles que l’autheur y a mises et apperceuës, et y preste des sens 
et des visages plus riches. (127)12
Montaigne recognized, that is, that a work’s meaning inevitably exceeds 
authorial intention and control. For Montaigne, then, anachronism (along 
with one’s awareness of it) was not an obstacle but a condition for creative 
interpretation, interpretation that would generously add to the semantic 
richness of the text rather than reifying it as a pure object of analysis devoid 
of any readerly participation.13
Imperfection’s Parallax
Might it not be more productive to see the reconstructive historical perspec-
tive and the contemporary theoretical perspective on Montaigne in terms of 
the parallax view? Reading the Essays parallactically would affirm the aporia 
of reading the historical Montaigne through our modern lens, an aporia that 
the duck/rabbit metaphor articulates but ultimately fails to sustain. A paral-
lax view on the Essays begins with shifting the terms of the debate, calling 
into question the contemporary interpretive scene, a scene dominated if 
not overdetermined by categories like the historical versus the modern (or 
in Cave’s example, the duck versus the rabbit —  or its happy synthesis in a 
magical “single creature”). A parallactic mode of reading, in this respect, would 
resemble and be faithful to the illogical logic of the essay: it would carefully 
attend to the ways the essayist produces an array of incommensurable per-
spectives (there is no metalanguage of the Essays), sampling a wide range of 
semiotic codes, while acknowledging that readers will invariably offer their 
own perspectives on the Essays’ inexhaustible mix.14
This way of framing the parallax view also enables us to entertain more 
than two perspectives on Montaigne (Montaigne as a man of the Renaissance 
and Montaigne as our contemporary), opening a space for a multiplicity of 
alternatives. In some ways, it recognizes that these perspectives were already 
multiple, split from within: a contextualist approach may privilege the per-
sonal life of Montaigne (the Essays as autobiography) or it may accentuate the 
historical events of the period (the wars of religion, the New World conquest, 
etc.). Likewise, a contemporary perspective may borrow from the language 
of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, or feminism, to name a few. Again, the 
interpretive challenge lies not in any attempt to harmonize these perspectives, 
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to naturalize their differences, but to embrace (and responsively contribute 
to) their frictions and incommensurabilities.
To return to Hoffmann’s observation that “publications à l’essai did not 
so much constitute a genre as foster a provisional status for their writers,” I 
would propose that the problematic of imperfection itself —  a major concern 
of the Essays —  exceeds its original context. The notion itself needs to be 
rethought parallactically. Lacking the perfection of some authors —  who did 
not hesitate to produce final versions of their work, published as discourses, 
for example —  Montaigne keenly recognizes his ontological unrootedness, 
which in turn compels the act of essaying: “If my mind could gain a firm 
footing,” Montaigne famously pondered in “Of Repentance,” “I would not 
make essays, I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on 
trial” (III, 2, 611b) [“Si mon ame pouvoit prendre pied, je ne m’essaierois pas, 
je me resoudrois: elle est tousjours en apprentissage et en espreuve” (805)]. 
Adding to the essay’s semantic richness and complexity is its transmutation 
into a verb. This move arguably shifts our attention from the question of the 
essay (the essay as a genre and the vexed issue of its historicity) to the mean-
ing of essaying (the essay as a hermeneutic practice).
In the liminal chapter “Of Idleness,” Montaigne presents himself first and 
foremost as an interpreter of his own unruliness. It is Montaigne’s ideas or 
fantaisies that evoke defiance and frustration. By describing them as “chimeras 
and fantastic monsters” (I, 8, 21a) [“chimeres et monstres fantasques” (33)], 
Montaigne from the start recognizes his subject matter’s profound indocil-
ity, its challenge to hermeneutic mastery. In a late addition to “Of the Power 
of the Imagination,” Montaigne also evokes the theme of unruliness when 
talking of his sexual organ:
People are right to notice the unruly liberty of this member, obtruding so 
importunately when we have no use for it, and failing so importunately 
when we have the most use for it, and struggling for mastery so imperiously 
with our will, refusing with so much pride and obstinacy our solicitations, 
both mental and manual. (I, 20, 72c)
On a raison de remarquer l’indocile liberté de ce membre, s’ingerant si 
importunement, lors que nous n’en avons que faire, et defaillant si impor-
tunement, lors que nous en avons le plus affaire, et contestant de l’authorité 
si imperieusement avec nostre volonté, refusant avec tant de fierté et 
d’obstination noz solicitations et mentales et manuelles. (102).
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Ironically imputing agency to his “unruly member,” Montaigne rejects the 
ideal of perfectio (man’s identification with the divine), expressing his skepti-
cism about the mind’s ability to achieve any semblance of classic self- mastery. 
Here Montaigne, through his emphasis on the arbitrariness of sexual desire, 
demystifies the concept of the will valorized by prior Renaissance humanists 
such as Pico della Mirandola.15 In his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), the 
Italian philosopher argued that God made man neither mortal nor immortal, 
giving him instead the freedom and power to be his own sculptor and creator.16 
With this ontological makeup of the self, Pico all but created the Renais-
sance myth of the self- made man —  a subject capable of freely cultivating 
his soul and elevating himself to God- like stature. This optimistic humanist 
ideal finds its radical counterpart in Montaigne, who, in the closing pages of 
the Essays, depicts the violence inherent in the project of perfecting the self 
when perfectio hominis becomes coterminous with the eradication of one’s 
libidinal desires and corporeality: “That is madness: instead of changing into 
angels [in order to be closer to the divinitas of God], they change into beasts 
[a regression to the realm of animalitas]; instead of raising themselves, they 
lower themselves” (III, 13, 856b, emphasis added) [“C’est folie: au lieu de 
se transformer en anges, ils se transforment en bestes; au lieu de se hausser, 
ils s’abattent” (1115)]. With this conduplicatio, the repetition of the verb “se 
transformer,” Montaigne emphasizes the role of agency, thus pointing out that 
those who seek to perfect themselves are to a large extent responsible for their 
condition in their practices of self- care, practices that ironically might be better 
described, following Nietzsche, as symptomatic of an “incuria sui,” a careless-
ness of the self.17 The essayist, for his part, declines such a transcendental pull 
to go outside oneself (857b/1115), joyfully affirming his temporality, or as he 
puts it, his “temporal greatness,” (III, 7, 700c) [“grandeur temporelle” (917)].
Indeed, the essay form thrives in the absence of permanence. Not con-
ducive to conceptuality —  to the formation of concepts for the purpose of 
hermeneutic mastery —  the essay produces monsters, engendering unruly 
images in the perplexed mind of its author, making it (the essay) and him 
(Montaigne) unlikely models of and for perfection. The author’s original 
desire to impose a discursive order on his formless thoughts, “hoping in time 
to make [his] mind ashamed of itself ” (I, 8, 21a) [“esperant avec le temps luy 
en faire honte à luy mesmes” (33)], proves unsuccessful, as evidenced by his 
reference to them in a later essay as “grotesques and monstrous bodies” (I, 
28, 135a) [“crotesques et corps monstrueux” (183)]. Such a failure to conform 
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to the ideal of stasis, an ideal revered by the Senecan sage, has led critics to 
reconceptualize the author’s understanding of perfection (and imperfection) 
in terms of his investment in skepticism. In his article “Epoche as Perfection: 
Montaigne’s View of Ancient Skepticism,” José R. Maia Neto carefully examines 
Montaigne’s description of skepticism in the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 
demonstrating how the essayist conceives of this ancient school as having 
reached “the utmost height of human nature” (371a) [“la hauteur extreme 
de l’humaine nature” (502)]. Understanding perfection in the Aristotelian 
sense of accomplishment, Neto argues that the skeptic notion of epoche, the 
suspension of judgment (“‘I hold back, I do not budge’” (374a) [“je soutiens, 
je ne bouge” [505]), enables individuals to be who they are (it acknowledges 
the limited character of their nature) and thus provides, for Montaigne, the 
best means of attaining happiness. According to Neto, Socrates —  the father of 
ancient skepticism —  becomes the object of genuine imitatio for Montaigne, 
since the former embodies the disruptive and dialogical thrust —  
The leader of his dialogues, Socrates, is always asking questions and stir-
ring up discussion, never concluding, never satisfying; and says he has no 
other knowledge than that of opposing. (II, 12, 377c)
Le conducteur de ses dialogismes, Socrates, va tousjours demandant et 
esmouvant la dispute, jamais l’arrestant, jamais satisfaisant, et dict n’avoir 
autre science que la science de s’opposer. (509)
 —  that the latter’s essayistic style will seek to duplicate at the textual level.18
Conversely, Emmanuel Faye, in his impressive volume Philosophie et perfec-
tion de l’homme: De la Renaissance à Descartes, relegates this central passage 
from the “Apology” to a footnote, choosing instead to focus on “the moral 
wisdom of Socrates,”19 on a Socrates who embodies the ethos of philosophy, 
“this confidence in the natural capacities and faculties of man, in his aptitude 
to fulfill his potential on his own, in the goal of achieving his own perfection.”20 
Sharing the Socratic ideal of wisdom, Montaigne defines humanity in moral 
rather than theological terms, grounding it in conscience rather than devo-
tion.21 On Faye’s account, Montaigne’s perfection does not lie in his skeptical 
epoche but in his valorization of human dignity, in his quest for knowledge. 
Faye reminds us that the essayist, far from being critical of philosophy, rec-
ommends to his ideal tutor that philosophy become the primary subject 
matter for the pupil: “For philosophy, which, as the molder of judgment and 
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conduct, will be his principal lesson, has this privilege of being everywhere 
at home” (I, 26, 121– 22a) [“Car la philosophie, qui, comme formatrice des 
jugements et des meurs, sera sa principale leçon, a ce privilege de se mesler 
par tout” (164)]. Montaigne’s Essays and fantasies are indeed presented by 
their own author as “purely human and philosophical, with no admixture of 
theology” (I, 56, 234b) [“purement humains et philosophiques, sans meslange 
de Theologie” (322)].
These words take center stage as well in Tzvetan Todorov’s study Le Jar-
din imparfait: La pensée humaniste en France, inaugurating, as it were, a new 
humanism that will find its full realization in the Enlightenment:
The term humanist has several meanings, but we can say in a first approxi-
mation that it refers to the doctrines according to which man is the point 
of departure and the point of reference for human actions. . . . The term 
humanist figures, perhaps for the first time in French, in a passage by Mon-
taigne in which he uses it to characterize his own practice, in contrast to 
that of theologians. Though he grants the theologians their right to respect, 
and certainly to existence, he prefers to separate the two domains and 
reserve a new field for the “humanists,” which consists of strictly human 
activities or “fantasies,” of “pure human” writings.22
Contrary to Faye, Todorov does not perceive any commitment to perfectio 
hominis in Montaigne’s Essays. Quite the opposite, it is imperfection, synony-
mous here with critical skepticism, that plays a structural role in the author’s 
work. Todorov borrows the title of his volume from Montaigne: “(a) Je veux 
qu’on agisse, (c) et qu’on allonge les offices de la vie tant qu’on peut, (a) et 
que la mort me treuve plantant mes chous, mais nonchalant d’elle, et encore 
plus de mon jardin imparfait” (I, 20, 89). The English title of Todorov’s book 
is Imperfect Garden, which cannot fully convey the semantic richness of the 
French word. The term has posed a problem for Montaigne’s English transla-
tors, as the following versions show:
I would have a man to be doing, and to prolong his lives offices, as much as 
lieth in him, and let death carelesse of her dart, but more of my unperfect 
garden.23
I want us to be doing things, prolonging life’s duties as much as we can; 
I want Death to find me planting my cabbages, neither worrying about it 
nor the unfinished gardening.24
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I want a man to act, and to prolong the functions of life as long as he can; 
and I want death to find me planting my cabbages, but careless of death, 
and still more of my unfinished garden.25
Of the three translations, Florio’s now archaic unperfect retains imparfait’s 
double meaning of imperfect and incomplete. A recent translation into modern 
French substitutes inachevé (unfinished) for imparfait in order to capture 
one sense of the word lost to modern ears, but thereby excludes the other.26 
It is not, of course, a question of choosing between the two: Montaigne is 
surely playing with the epithet’s double meaning. As with Neto and Faye, 
Todorov opts for a “philosophical” interpretation of imparfait, limiting, in 
turn, the word’s semantic slipperiness. Such a content- oriented reading fails 
to appreciate fully the performative dimension of the Essays. To do justice 
to any problematic addressed in the Essays, Montaigne’s reader must take 
seriously the unruly form of the essay.
Resolutely dwelling in his jardin imparfait, in the world of perpetual flux, 
Montaigne is the anti- Parmenides par excellence, refusing the unity of being 
and thinking. In contradistinction to the metaphysical view that being and 
thinking coincide, Montaigne embraces a subject matter that is, in Levinasian 
parlance, otherwise than being. Its pursuit is an endless task: “There is no end 
to our researches; our end is in the other world” (III, 13, 817b) [“Il n’y a point 
de fin en nos inquisitions; nostre fin est en l’autre monde” (1068)]. At this 
point, one is tempted to see Montaigne as a philosopher of becoming:
I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with 
a natural drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment 
I give my attention to it. I do not portray being: I portray passing. . . . If my 
mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays, I would make 
decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial. (III, 2, 610– 11b)
Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va trouble et chancelant, d’une yvresse 
naturelle. Je le prens en ce poinct, comme il est, en l’instant que je m’amuse 
à luy. Je ne peints pas l’estre. Je peints le passage. . . . Si mon ame pouvoit 
prendre pied, je ne m’essaierois pas, je me resoudrois: elle est tousjours 
en apprentissage et en espreuve. (805)
Contrary to the didactic humanist leçons that preceded them, the Essays do 
not easily lend themselves to hermeneutic consumption; they only afford 
tentative and contestable self- knowledge.
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This might make Montaigne the essayist more of an anti- philosopher 
to the extent that perfection is not simply recognized as an impossibil-
ity —  imperfection is not, as the classic philosopher would have it, what one 
has to settle for in light of the unreachable plenitude of Being. Imperfection 
as such undergoes a process of transvaluation in the Essays. Like Nietzsche, 
who critically reappraised the world of appearance —  conceiving of it outside 
the static Platonic opposition of appearance and reality (“We have abolished 
the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! 
With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!”27) —  Montaigne 
alters the received meaning of imperfection, and more importantly, compels 
us to question the desirability of perfection, short- circuiting the Platonist 
system of thought.
Throughout the Essays, Montaigne expresses an unwillingness to mask his 
imperfections, preferring instead that his self- portrait be that of an imperfect, 
incomplete, and ever- changing face:
However that may be, I mean to say, and whatever these absurdities may 
be, I have had no intention of concealing them, any more than I would a 
bald and graying portrait of myself, in which the painter had drawn not a 
perfect face, but mine. (I, 26, 108a)
Quoy qu’il en soit, veux- je dire, et quelles que soyent ces inepties, je n’ay 
pas deliberé de les cacher, non plus qu’un mien pourtraict chauve et grison-
nant, où le peintre auroit mis, non un visage parfaict, mais le mien. (148)
Montaigne’s acknowledgment of his own “imperfect face” not only contrib-
utes to the problematization of a definitive answer to the question of identity 
(who he is) but also informs his interpretation of others (who the other is). 
But what does the face of the other look like? Hospitality toward alterity, as 
Lawrence Kritzman rightly observes, “requires the ability to transcend the 
self- contained world of narcissism.”28 Montaigne thematizes most clearly his 
ethics of alterity in the beginning of his essay “Of Cato the Younger,” where he 
admits his aversion to a relation to the other that neutralizes and assimilates 
the other’s difference:
[a] I do not share that common error of judging another by myself. I easily 
believe that another man may have qualities different from mine. . . . [c] I 
more easily admit difference than resemblance between us. . . . I consider 
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him simply in himself, without relations to others; I mold him to his own model. 
(I, 37, 169, emphasis added)
[a] Je n’ay point cette erreur commune de juger d’un autre selon que je suis. 
J’en croy aysément des choses diverses à moy. Je . . . [c] reçoy plus facilement 
la difference que la ressemblance en nous. Je. . .  le considere simplement en 
luy- mesme, sans relation, l’estoffant sur son propre modelle. (I, 37, 229)
We cannot solely rely, of course, on Montaigne’s stated predilection to receive 
alterity. We must always keep Montaigne’s desire in mind while also separating 
this desire from his textual performances. What Montaigne expresses in the 
above passage is a paradoxical ethical relation to the other. Montaigne’s herme-
neutics of difference is paradoxical to the extent that his ethical relation to the 
other —  to any other —  is, strictly speaking, “without relation.” His hermeneutic 
model posits an object of knowledge without, at the same time, acknowledging 
the voracious subject of knowledge. Yet not unlike his hunger to make himself 
known to others, Montaigne’s hunger for others is conditioned by an aporetic 
logic of its own. It expresses a double desire: first, a desire to know the other; 
second, a desire to sustain a relation of non- adequation, in which the other is 
irreducible to my cognitive powers. Montaigne’s generous impulse29 to engage 
with the otherness of past, present, and future minds captures the former desire 
(to know the other), whereas the dream of a pure ethics attests to the latter 
desire (to keep the other at an ethical distance beyond his narcissistic grasp).
What enables Montaigne to manage the incommensurability of these desires 
is the essay itself. Resistant to synthesis, the essay foregrounds hesitation as 
a hermeneutic stance and practice; it illustrates and enacts a new mode of 
thought. Montaigne may have only dreamed of a new language of skepticism, 
as his observation on the ancient skeptics suggests:
I can see why the Pyrrhonian philosophers cannot express their general 
conception in any manner of speaking; for they would need a new lan-
guage. (II, 12, 392b)
Je voy les philosophes Pyrrhoniens qui ne peuvent exprimer leur generale 
conception en aucune maniere de parler: car il leur faudroit un nouveau 
langage. (527).
Yet while the conditional “would need” hints at the virtual character or irreal-
ity of this “new language,” the very language of the Essays arguably performs 
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a kind of “Pyrrhonian abstinence,”30 pointing to the reality of such a new 
language (“a Pyrrhonism in an affirmative form” [376a] [“un Pyrrhonisme 
soubs une forme resolutive” (507)], in ways that may have exceeded Mon-
taigne’s own imagination. The newness of this skeptical language might also 
figure in Montaigne’s scandalous question “What do I know?” (393b) [“Que 
sçay- je?” (527)].31 Robert Eaglestone sums up well the ethical force of the 
interrogative: “Unlike a statement, a question is to be interrupted: a question 
starts a dialogue. An idea phrased as a question resists closure and begs not 
only an answer but another question, an interruption.”32
As we saw, the initial attempts to tame his unruly thoughts, to discipline 
them via writing, prove wholly unsuccessful, that is, not amenable to humanist 
discourse. Yet this “failure” gives birth to Montaigne the essayist, “a new figure: 
an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher” (II, 12, 409c) [“Nouvelle 
figure: un philosophe impremedité et fortuite” (546)].33 This “new figure” of 
the “accidental philosopher” might in fact be better described as an accidental 
theorist, if we understand theory as skeptical resistance,34 as a resistance to 
philosophy’s timeless dream of permanence and plenitude (the desire for 
unmediated Being, the Platonic eidos, the Thing itself, etc.). Indeed, Mon-
taigne’s philosopher of choice is not the authoritative Plato championed by 
Neoplatonists and others35 but the skeptical Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. 
Montaigne’s Socrates “is always asking questions and stirring up discussion, 
never concluding, never satisfying; and says he has no other knowledge than 
that of opposing.”36 It is this Socratic negativity that Montaigne the accidental 
theorist harnesses in the Essays. Montaigne, then, may have begun as a tradi-
tional philosopher, committed to hermeneutic self- mastery à la Seneca (as 
expressed in his desire to be “master of [him]self in every direction” [III, 5, 
639b] [“maistre de [s]oy, à tout sens” (841)]), only to come full circle, taking 
Seneca’s observation that “anything that can be added to is imperfect” as a 
condition for productive thinking rather than a prohibition.37
Monstrous Reading/Reading the Monstrous
Montaigne’s skepticism can perhaps be ascertained most visibly in his resistance 
to the humanist ideology of his period. One of the chief tropes of human-
ist discourse is the digestive metaphor, which transforms the Renaissance 
author into a cultural cannibal.38 The metaphor structures Joachim Du Bel-
lay’s influential Defense and Illustration of the French Language (1549), which 
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calls upon the French to emulate the Romans, who enriched themselves by 
“imitating the best Greek authors, transforming themselves into them, devour-
ing them, and after having fully digested them, converting them into blood 
and nourishment.”39 Conforming to his humanist horizon of expectations, 
Montaigne makes ample use of the digestive metaphor: “What good does it 
do us to have our belly full of meat if it is not digested, if it is not transformed 
into us, if it does not make us bigger and stronger?” (I, 25, 101a) [“Que nous 
sert- il d’avoir la panse pleine de viande, si elle ne se digere? si elle ne se trans- 
forme en nous? si elle ne nous augmente et fortifie?” (137).40 This thought is, 
of course, already present in Montaigne’s “To the Reader,” where the essay-
ist asserts that he is himself the matter of his book. But what are the ethical 
implications of the digestive metaphor when it is the other who is the object 
of knowledge? Isn’t there an ethical violence intrinsic to the absorption of 
the other’s otherness, to the humanist literary cannibalization of difference? 
In other words, then, how does Montaigne eat?
In an attempt to answer this question, I propose to turn in this final section to 
Montaigne’s representation of conjoined twins in his chapter “Of a Monstrous 
Child,” juxtaposing this depiction of difference with the author’s avowed dream 
of a relationless account of the other, his wish to consider the other simply in 
himself, without relations to others; molding him to his own model. What is at 
stake here is the possibility of a “purist” ethical stance, the recognition that, to 
borrow Derrida’s formulation, “every other is completely other [tout autre est 
tout autre].” Is Montaigne’s figuration of the monstrous child an example of the 
other as tout autre? At first glance, in his appeal to rationality (“this universal and 
natural reason” [II, 30, 539c] [“cette raison universelle et naturelle” (713)]) as a 
tool to combat and rectify our tendency to err and be astonished by “novelty” 
(539c) (“la nouvelleté” [713]), Montaigne’s representation of the monstrous 
child might strike the reader more as proto- Cartesian than Levinasian.41 For 
Montaigne the rationalist, the experience of monstrosity is ultimately a mis-
recognition, evidence of our inability to transcend our particular perspective, 
to step outside the workings of custom —  to emancipate ourselves from this 
“violent and treacherous schoolmistress” (I, 23, 77a) [“violente et traistresse 
maistresse d’escole” [109]). The child in itself is not monstrous either to God 
or to nature. Following Augustine, Montaigne writes in his Bordeaux Copy,
What we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity 
of his work the infinity of forms that he has comprised in it. . . . We call 
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contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; nothing is anything 
but according to nature, whatever it may be. (539c)
Ce que nous appellons monstres, ne le sont pas à Dieu, qui voit en 
l’immensité de son ouvrage l’infinité des formes qu’il y a comprinses. . . . 
Nous apelons contre nature ce qui advient contre la coustume: rien n’est 
que selon elle, quel qu’il soit. (713)
To be sure, the use of the term “monstrous” might be necessary (Montaigne, 
in fact, gives it prominence by placing it in the title of the essay) until we 
detach ourselves from our (subjective) perspective, elevate ourselves above 
the insidious workings of custom, and come to view the world from God’s 
standpoint, adopting, in other words, a “view from nowhere.”42 At the very 
least, Montaigne’s reflections on the fictitious nature of monstrosity appear 
to be hinting at the possibility of an objective apprehension of the child. But 
by positing the child’s objective reality, hasn’t Montaigne at the same time 
reduced the radical other to an object of discourse by transforming him into 
a theme, an example of Nature?
While Montaigne does seem to gesture toward a purist epistemological 
stance (a totalized relation to the object of knowledge, a radical reversal of 
his ethical wish to read the other according to his own model), I would argue 
that Montaigne, unlike Augustine, adopts this ideal epistemic position for 
rhetorical purposes. As a remedy for our will to allegorize —  that is, society’s 
penchant for ideologically transmuting physical deformation into an other- 
worldly phenomenon —  Montaigne posits a divine, unmediated perspec-
tive paradoxically in order to demystify common readings of the monstrous 
child. Such readings interpret the child as an omen, a providential sign (“a 
favorable prognostic” [539/713a]) within a metaphysical framework: it is 
sent by God to show the king how to deal with rivaling political factions. If 
Montaigne is justified in objecting to the instrumentalization and political 
allegorization of the child,43 does he go too far in annulling the other’s alter-
ity? An answer to this question hinges on the meaning of alterity. Montaigne 
is not necessarily objecting to a Levinasian understanding of alterity, where 
“the other bears alterity as an essence,”44 but to the speculative meaning one 
imputes to this alterity, to the horizon of meaning under which the child’s 
intelligibility is made manifest. As an alternative to the typically speculative 
early modern accounts of “monsters,” Montaigne offers a remarkably brief 
physical description of the child, who is joined to a second, headless body,45 
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returning him (in the late addition to the essay) to his rightful place within 
the order of things, among God’s diverse creatures. The allegorical reading 
of the child thus serves as an example of interpretations to avoid; the case of 
the “imperfect child” (538a) [“enfant imparfait” (713)] illustrates the need to 
beat down our will to know/mystify, to keep in check our libido sciendi, for, 
as he tells us elsewhere, “I am afraid we have eyes bigger than our stomachs, 
and more curiosity than capacity” (I, 31, 150a) [“J’ay peur que nous ayons 
les yeux plus grands que le ventre, et plus de curiosité que nous n’avons de 
capacité” (203)].
But is a cognitive awareness of the distinction between one’s experience 
of the world (seeing the child as monstrous) and the reality of the world 
(everything in the world is natural) sufficient to transform or reform our 
prereflective consciousness of the world? Can we escape so easily from 
custom? For Montaigne, denaturalizing custom involves a perpetual cri-
tique, a constant struggle against the forces that have given us “the laws of 
conscience” (I, 23, 83c) [“les loix de la conscience” (115)], that have made 
custom second nature to us: “Habit is a second nature, and no less power-
ful” (III, 10, 772b) [“L’accoustumance est une seconde nature, et non moins 
puissante” (1010)]. In this light, Montaigne’s more positive imperative to 
naturalize nature seems naïvely optimistic. To naturalize the strange child 
would amount to seeing him outside of interpretation, where the other’s 
underlying “natural” sameness —  that is, his humanity —  would be simul-
taneously revealed and embraced.
Yet for Montaigne, human nature and more generally the world (“the 
world is nothing but variety and dissimilarity” [II, 2, 244a] [“le monde n’est 
que varieté et dissemblance” [339]) are hardly homogenous: “There is more 
difference between a given man and a given man than between a given ani-
mal and a given man” (II, 12, 342a) [“Il se trouve plus de difference de tel 
homme à tel homme que de tel animal à tel homme” (466)]. Recognizing 
a shared humanity with the child does not rule out an appreciation of his 
difference. Moreover, difference does not only pertain to external matters, 
matters concerning the other. The difference of the other should not blind 
us to the difference that inhabits all human beings:
We are all patchwork, and so shapeless and diverse in composition that 
each bit, each moment, plays its own game. And there is as much difference 
between us and ourselves as between us and others. (II, 1, 244a)
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Nous sommes tous de lopins, et d’une contexture si informe et diverse, 
que chaque piece, chaque momant, faict son jeu. Et se trouve autant de 
difference de nous à nous mesmes, que de nous à autruy. (337)
Montaigne illustrates, if not performs, the unruliness of his own alterity in 
“Of Cripples,” where the cognitive distinction between being and appearance 
that structures Montaigne’s thought in “Of a Monstrous Child” is displaced 
and rendered virtually ineffective:
I have seen no more evident monstrosity and miracle in the world than 
myself. We become habituated to anything strange by use and time; but the 
more I frequent myself and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes 
me, and the less I understand myself. (III, 11, 787b)
Je n’ay veu monstre et miracle au monde plus expres que moy- mesme. 
On s’apprivoise à toute estrangeté par l’usage et le temps; mais plus je me 
hante et me connois, plus ma difformité m’estonne, moins je m’entens en 
moy. (1029).46
Far from resulting in a privileged access to one’s being, or in the affirmation 
of autonomy, essayistic self- study defamiliarizes and astonishes its faithful 
practitioner. It discloses reason in its utter weakness or lameness; like a cripple, 
reason limps. It fails to secure the foundations for self- knowledge; yet in its 
failure, reason —  under the pressure of the essaying process —  paradoxically 
succeeds in revealing to its author his irreducible alterity, his own monstrosity. 
To be clear, experiencing himself as monstrous here is not a misrecognition 
(of his “natural” being) but an attestation of his unruly self, or what we could 
describe as his semiotic monstrosity, a self that is beyond representational or 
hermeneutic mastery. Indeed, so cognizant of his own foreignness to himself, 
how can Montaigne assert the transparency and homogeneity of the other?47 
More importantly, Montaigne’s untotalizable self- relation obliquely points to 
an extra- discursivity, to something that escapes the habitual economy of the 
Same, yet without simultaneously positing a self that is outside the realm of 
interpretation and becoming.
Counterbalancing the insights of “Of a Monstrous Child” with those of “Of 
Cripples,” then, enables the reader to entertain a parallax view of monstrosity, 
which reveals a very different and far less Cartesian account of monstrosity 
than was suggested earlier. While “Of a Monstrous Child” warns against the 
dangers of astonishment (“the error and astonishment that novelty brings us” 
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[539c] [“l’erreur et l’estonnement que la nouvelleté nous apporte” [713]), “Of 
Cripples” presents astonishment as the appropriate response to the author’s 
natural unruliness and semiotic monstrosity. As if directly responding to the 
excesses of the Montaignian self, to the self ’s internal otherness, Descartes 
moves to pathologize the experience of “astonishment”: “Astonishment is 
an excess of wonder which can never be anything but bad,” he writes in The 
Passions of the Soul.48 This Cartesian critique of astonishment should not 
be confused with Montaigne’s. If Descartes is primarily concerned with the 
possibility of epistemological paralysis (the cogito’s inability to convert the 
new —  the object of wonder, attractive in its rarity —  into an object of knowl-
edge), Montaigne’s “Of a Monstrous Child” decries the allergic, exploitative, 
and totalizing reactions that the newness or singularity of the child’s unruly 
body has provoked.
In “Of Cripples,” Montaigne offers an alternative account of astonish-
ment, one that is to be identified not with paralysis but with care, that is, 
an attentiveness to the inexhaustible and heterogeneous nature of his self. 
Such a care begins with a care for language, expressing his preference for the 
tentative, the partial:
It makes me hate probable things when they are planted on me as infal-
lible. I like these words, which soften and moderate the rashness of our 
propositions: “perhaps,” “to some extent,” “some,” “they say,” “I think,” 
and the like. (788b)
On me faict hayr les choses vray- semblables quand on me les plante pour 
infaillibles. J’ayme ces mots, qui amollissent et moderent la temerité de 
nos propositions: A l’avanture, Aucunement, Quelque, On dict, Je pense, 
et semblables. (1030)
A more nuanced or self- critical response to astonishment is arguably already at 
work in “Of a Monstrous Child.” At first glance, Montaigne might be accused 
of having replaced one totalized relation for another, affirming at the end of the 
essay the ontological Said of the child: he is, in the final analysis, natural like 
us. Does Montaigne fail, then, to respond to the alterity of the child, effacing 
the differences that ought to have sustained their dissymmetrical relation? 
How does Montaigne preserve the child as a genuine object of wonder?
It is not by establishing a relation to an absolute alterity that Montaigne 
extends his care to the other, since reading the other according to his own 
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model is, strictly speaking, impossible —  or rather, it is only “possible” for God. 
Knowledge of God is a limit case. In the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 
Montaigne also conceives of God as an object of wonder, irreducible to 
what is familiar, an “incomprehensible power” (380a/513).49 A recognition 
of God’s absolute alterity is what Montaigne, along with Saint Paul, finds 
“most excusable” in pagan religions (380a/513). Yet Montaigne’s relation 
to others differs from his relation to God in that his quest to know others 
is problematized rather than relinquished; it is complicated by the essay-
ing process, a constant return to the skeptical question “What do I know?” 
Montaigne never subjects God to essaying. Whereas a respect for the alterity 
of God stems in large part from one’s faith in Him (God cannot be known 
directly nor by “our analogies and conjectures” [380a/512]), Montaigne’s 
respect for the other’s alterity is of a different ethical order; it derives from 
his self- exploration, from his awareness that the other is as elusive as the 
author’s unruly self.
In “Of a Monstrous Child,” the child’s alterity (the tout autre of the child) 
is affirmed in relational rather than in absolute terms. Montaigne’s ethical 
sensibility can be formulated in terms of a double movement, a movement 
intrinsic to the endless act of eating well —  the perpetual unsaying and resaying 
of the ontological Said. The essayist demystifies monstrosity by affirming a 
shared humanity with the child. In neutralizing the child’s cultural alterity —  his 
source of instrumentalization, exploitation, and dehumanization —  Montaigne 
cannibalizes or assimilates the monstrous other, transforming him into a 
comprehensible object of knowledge. Yet this process of cannibalization also 
reflects an interplay between mastery and opacity. The alterity of the child 
is not affirmed in abstraction but experienced as a rupture, a textual distur-
bance relative to his readers’ expectations. This recognition/reinscription of 
difference, performed through a problematization of pre- given schemata 
and categories, is further displayed by Montaigne’s staging of the incom-
mensurability of his situated (historical) reader’s contingent position and 
the ideal (ahistorical) epistemological view from nowhere (that of God or 
Nature). By offering his readers two subject positions that they cannot simply 
adopt or reject, Montaigne attests to the perplexities involved in represent-
ing the other. This rhetorical strategy, especially if read comparatively with 
the essayist’s self- avowed semiotic monstrosity in “Of Cripples,” preserves 
the irreducibility and mystery of the other, which in turn helps to sustain a 
relation of non- adequation (a “relation without relation”) with the child, 
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and guarantees that the “monstrous” other will continue to shock and to 
produce astonishment in the beholder. But unlike the version condemned 
by Montaigne in “Of a Monstrous Child,” this astonishment is a precondition 
for ethics or eating well, arising from the beholder’s generosity and openness 
to alterity, from a sensibility, that is, to the diversity and unruliness of nature.
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